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Linking Bargains on Trade and Security
A number of studies have found that military alliances affect trade (e.g., Gowa & Mansfield, 1993 Gowa, 1994; Mansfield & Bronson, 1997) . From a realist perspective, these studies theorize that allies trade more than non-allies because states are wary of the security externalities that arise through bilateral economic exchange. Trade produces a security externality for states because there is no guarantee that the gains from trade will not be used to bolster military strength and, in turn, to threaten trade partners. Military alliances implicitly enforce cooperation in trade by creating incentives for allied governments to value their trade partners' gains, as wealth gained from trade increases the potential military power of the alliance.
We argue that government negotiators sometimes link trade and security agreements to overcome both bargaining and enforcement problems. Issue linkage may allow leaders to surmount the dilemmas of cooperation by increasing the type and range of distributed benefits and by limiting incentives for opportunism. As a result, military alliances may be particularly likely to have economic consequences for their members if the treaty is specifically linked to commercial cooperation. When alliance agreements are explicitly linked to economic cooperation, we should expect to see increased economic exchange coinciding with coordinated security policies. In cases in which economic cooperation was not a part of the alliance, the influence of alliances on trade may be much smaller.
In order to evaluate the claim that coordinated negotiation over trade concessions and military alliances helps to account for an observed increase in trade associated with alliances, we have identified alliance treaties that contain content explicitly requiring economic cooperation.
We compare levels of trade among states with alliance treaties that include provisions specifying 1 . Following Leeds et al. (2002: 238) , we define alliances as 'written agreements, signed by official representatives of at least two independent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict, to remain neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain from military 2 economic cooperation to trade among states that are allied but do not require economic cooperation in their alliance and to trade among states that are not allied. In our analysis of trade among European states between 1885 and 1938, we find evidence in support of our argument.
First, trade among allies who have specified economic cooperation in their alliance agreements is higher than trade among non-allied states and higher than trade among allies who have not promised economic cooperation. Second, trade among allies without specific economic provisions in their agreements is statistically indistiguishable from trade among non-allies.
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review prior arguments and empirical evidence regarding relationships between alliances and trade patterns. Then, we offer an alternative argument based on issue linkage. Next we provide an empirical evaluation of the links between jointly negotiated military and economic treaties and increased levels of trade.
We provide evidence of the inclusion of economic bargains in the text of military alliance agreements and demonstrate the frequency with which this linkage occurs, and we present a statistical analysis of European trade that compares the trade of non-allies, allies, and allies with economic provisions in their alliance agreements. In the final section we evaluate the conclusions to be drawn from this study and the most fruitful areas for future research.
The Trade-Alliance Relationship
The most prominent argument concerning a relationship between military alliances and trade suggests that bilateral commercial exchange produces security externalities.
1 International trade conflict with one another, or to consult/cooperate in the event of international crises that create a potential for military conflict.'
2 . Gowa and Mansfield (2004) point out that this argument applies especially when goods exchanged are subject to increasing returns to scale. Consequently, security externalities from trade may alter behavior by states and firms.
Governments could manage trade policy to direct trade toward allies and away from actual or potential adversaries. Further, the causal mechanism behind a positive relationship between alliances and trade could be a reaction by firms to positive political relationships between states (e.g., Morrow, Siverson, & Tabares, 1998; Long, 2003; Gowa & Mansfield, 2004) . When firms feel secure that conflict between their state and that of their trading partners is unlikely to occur and that the states will work together to promote commerce between their respective businesses, they are more likely to invest in trade. Investments to serve export markets are often relationspecific, which forces firms to guard against future opportunistic behavior by trading partners.
As a result, firms are more likely to establish business relationships with the firms of a state that is allied to their government. 2 Allied governments have political/military incentives to enforce trade contracts between their firms because trade increases the potential military power of the alliance (Gowa & Mansfield, 2004) .
We agree that alliances function to reassure firms that their trading relationships will remain safe into the future and that they can count on cooperation between their governments to ensure this. Yet, implicit issues of enforcement may not be the only factors encouraging trade among allies, and we may be able to distinguish the cases in which alliances provide greater enforcement for economic deals by the explicit reference to such issues in alliance agreements.
In addition, stronger commercial ties may be a "carrot" used to encourage acceptance of an alliance by a reluctant partner. Perhaps paying attention to the explicit linkage of these issues will help us to understand more fully why alliances encourage commercial interaction. Bargaining failures occur when two or more parties are unable to agree on a mutually acceptable division of costs and benefits associated with cooperation. Sometimes bargaining failures occur even when a set of agreements exists that both sides would prefer to no agreement because negotiators have incentives to misrepresent their 'bottom line' in attempting to get a better deal (e.g., Fearon, 1995 Fearon, , 1998 . Sometimes, however, there is no cooperative agreement that both sides prefer to the status quo. In these cases, linking issues may pave the way for cooperation by creating zones of mutual benefit that might not have existed on a single issue dimension (Tollison & Willett, 1979; Hoekman, 1989; Morgan, 1994; Davis, 2004) . Negotiating agreements on two or more issues simultaneously and tying the fulfillment of these agreements together can produce cooperative outcomes that both sides prefer to the status quo. ' (1979: 426) .
Issue Linkage and International Cooperation
Thus, if a leader sees great benefit from a military alliance with another state, but the desire for the alliance is not equally shared, it is possible that sweetening the pot, for instance, by offering to reduce trade barriers, would make the deal more attractive. A leader may not be willing to agree to economic concessions alone, but will open her state's market in return for an alliance commitment. Similarly, the leader of the potential partner may not be willing to sign an alliance absent the linked economic deal, but obtaining benefits in the economic sphere might make the alliance worthwhile. While neither an economic nor a security agreement is mutually 3 . Morrow (1991) argues that alliances sometimes represent security/autonomy trade-offs between states, in which some alliance members increase their security and others gain support for their international policies (see also Schroeder, 1976) . This broader argument is commensurate with the issue linkage argument presented here. Morrow argues that these tradeoffs are particularly likely to occur in asymmetric dyads (i.e., between major powers and minor powers), with the major power offering security to the minor power in return for political support. Negotiating power on an individual agreement, however, may not reflect overall power relations between two states, but rather may be a function of the relative salience of the agreement at stake and the availability of outside alternatives. Morrow's argument about security-autonomy trade-offs may be broader than originally claimed. 6 acceptable on its own, the joint agreement appeals to both sides. 3 Issue linkage can help states to solve bargaining dilemmas and find agreements that improve upon the status quo for both parties.
As Fearon (1998) notes, however, leaders will only bargain seriously when they believe that there is a reasonable probability that the parties will have incentives to uphold the agreement. Many issues over which leaders might value cooperation produce incentives for opportunism. Trade and alliance politics certainly fall into this category. Scholars have often argued that international trade is a good example of the classic prisoners' dilemma (e.g., Conybeare, 1984) . While leaders prefer mutual cooperation to mutual defection, they most prefer to be able to protect their own markets while having access to that of their partner, an outcome that imposes costs on the party that cooperates without reciprocation. Leaders who prefer open trade to protectionism if equally practiced might be unwilling to form an agreement if they feel vulnerable to cheating. Similarly, while both participants might value an alliance for the deterrence it produces and the economies of scale in defense provision, each might prefer not to fulfill the agreement if it is invoked by attack on the partner. Leaders who prefer alliance formation to increased individual security expenses might nevertheless be reluctant to cooperate due to fear of abandonment (e.g., Snyder, 1997) .
Scholars have often considered issue linkage as one way to overcome enforcement problems like these in international relations. Value for the long term benefits of a cooperative relationship can outweigh the short run gains from cheating and violation; this is the logic of cooperative solutions to the iterated prisoners' dilemma (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Taylor, 1987) .
Linking issues helps to make cooperative behavior self-enforcing by increasing the value of future cooperation, thus lengthening the 'shadow of the future' (e.g., Axelrod & Keohane, 1986; McGinnis, 1986; Keohane & Martin, 1995; Abbott & Snidal, 2000) .
Thus, to increase the value of the alliance or trade agreement and provide the needed assurance that a promise will be kept, leaders can make beneficial economic exchange and continued security cooperation contingent upon one another. Tying economic and security agreements together can reduce incentives to defect from either agreement and facilitate cooperative relationships that were previously viewed as too risky. Failing to fulfill military obligations would put commercial exchange in danger, and failing to adhere to trade agreements could lead to alliance termination, making unilateral defection on either less attractive. When incentives exist to defect unilaterally from agreements on economic and security issues, linking the two may change these incentives and make the joint agreement self-enforcing. Firms, 4 . It is well established that trade agreements have a positive impact on trade levels (e.g., Linnemann, 1966; Pollins, 1989; Mansfield & Bronson, 1997) .
5 . Mansfield & Bronson (1997) argue that both alliances and preferential trading arrangements should lead to increased commerce. They find that states that belong to both an alliance and a PTA together have higher levels of trade than states that share membership in only one or the other. 4 This in turn could pave the way for an improved understanding of the causal mechanism behind any correlation between alliances and trade. 5 In the following section, we discuss the identification of alliances involving economic negotiations.
Then, we evaluate the hypothesis that linked agreements account for increased trade among allies.
Explicit Linkages Between Trade Policy and Alliance Formation
How often are economic negotiations linked to negotiations over military alliances? A careful reading of the treaty content of the 213 alliances included in version 1.0 of the Alliance Treaty
Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset reveals that 39 of the treaties, 18%, either include articles requiring specific acts of economic cooperation (for instance, the removal of certain trade barriers), or include statements requiring general economic cooperation and/or declaring that commercial agreements will be negotiated in the near future. 837-843). The 1921 alliance between France and Poland specifies that it does not become effective until a commercial agreement is in force (Wandycz, 1962: 393) . The 1934 treaty signed by Austria, Hungary, and Italy specifies that bilateral trade agreements must be concluded within two months, and that in these agreements, the states will 'take the necessary steps to remedy the difficulties encountered by Hungary as a result of the fall in the price of wheat'
(League of Nations, 1934: 295) . In all, sixteen agreements include specific economic commitments, and twenty-three additional alliances include general promises of economic cooperation, often combined with statements promising the quick negotiation of companion economic agreements.
These statistics and examples demonstrate that there is variation in whether economic cooperation is explicitly linked to military cooperation. Not every alliance in the ATOP dataset includes economic obligations. It seems reasonable to infer that a treaty with provisions addressing more than one issue is the manifestation of explicit linkage in the negotiation of these issues. The inclusion of a promise to cooperate economically is not coincidental when it occurs; leaders intended to make economic cooperation and security cooperation contingent upon one
another. Historical accounts of alliance negotiations further support this view.
Brawley (1998), for instance, claims that the liberalization of German trade policy through a number of bilateral agreements in the early 1890's was motivated in part by a desire to maintain important alliances; Austria-Hungary, in particular, demanded improved access to the German market for agricultural products in return for political loyalty. Newnham (2000) notes the role of Germany's willingness to liberalize trade and make loans to Russia in encouraging Russia to sign the 1887 Reinsurance Treaty. One of the most clear cases of linked economic and military negotiations, however, occurred between France and Belgium after the first world war.
After World War I, French leaders were motivated by their fear of another German attack. They pursued a combined strategy of working to keep Germany weak, and of strengthening their bonds to other states with incentives to oppose German attack (e.g., Langsam, 1948: 173-199; Parker, 1969: 56-93; Albrecht-Carrie, 1973: 406-411) . A crucial part of their defensive plan was alliance with Belgium, which had so recently served as the conduit for German aggression. The
Maginot line defense required Belgian cooperation, and to the French it seemed obvious that the Belgians needed a defensive commitment from France also (Helmreich, 1964; Kieft, 1972; Marks, 1981: 247-248) .
French leaders succeeded in signing an alliance treaty for mutual defense with the United
States and Great Britain, but the treaty was not ratified by the United States, and Great Britain refused to accept defensive obligations to France without the concurrent commitment of the United States. While Belgium saw value in being tied to a coalition involving the USA, the UK, and France, when the USA and UK withdrew from the tripartite plan, Belgian leaders questioned whether alliance with France offered more benefits or more costs. It was not clear to Belgian leaders even after their neutrality had been brutally violated that abandoning that longstanding policy in favor of alliance with France would improve Belgian security. In fact, it seemed potentially more risky to create a clearly antagonistic relationship with their large German neighbor than to remain uncommitted. By allying with France, Belgium would ensure its involvement in any Franco-German war (Helmreich, 1964; Rothstein, 1968: 72-88; Kieft, 1972) .
But Belgium did have a desire for a stronger, and more equal, commercial relationship with France. With Germany weakened, French economic power was likely to dominate the Western part of the continent. Belgian leaders found this a matter of great concern and expressed their fears of French economic domination. The Belgians were particularly interested in the future of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, which prior to the war was economically linked to Germany. Because of its minuscule size, Luxembourg needed an economic union with a neighbor. Belgium depended on the Luxembourg railroad system for much of its most profitable trade, and thus, the Belgians wanted the French to pave the way for economic union between Belgium and Luxembourg, which would include Belgian control over the Luxembourg railroads. Belgium also wanted a reduction in French tariffs (Gathorne-Hardy, 1938: 19-20; Langsam, 1948: 174; Helmreich, 1964; Marks, 1981; Reiter, 1996: 128-132 form an economic union with Belgium, and a formal alliance between France and Belgium was signed the following autumn (Helmreich, 1964; Marks, 1981: 340-344 ). The alliance was followed by a reduction of French tariffs on foreign goods transported through Antwerp (Gathorne-Hardy, 1938: 20) .
In the French-Belgian case, the leaders of a smaller power believed they had choices about whether and how tightly to commit themselves to their major power partner (Reiter, 1996: 128-132). The major power saw enough utility in the alliance to make concessions on contentious economic issues in exchange for the alliance. The result was a much stronger trading relationship between France and Belgium during their period of alliance, as one can see in Figure 1 . (Kieft, 1972: 49) .
There seems to be evidence that in some cases, economic and security agreements are explicitly linked. If governmental economic agreements have an effect on levels of trade between states, and if agreements on trade are sometimes linked to agreements for security cooperation, then a relationship between alliances and trade might be observed as a result of this linked negotiation. In the following section, we discuss our empirical evaluation of this relationship.
European Alliances and Trade Before World War II
7 . The functional form of the gravity equation is multiplicative (Bergstrand, 1985) . Therefore, we take the natural log of all interval level variables to make the equation linear. The first thing we learn is that while a number of European alliances in the inter-war period include provisions explicitly specifying economic cooperation, these provisions were virtually non-existent in Europe prior to WWI. Because of these differences, we present analysis of the full time period, but also analyze the pre-WWI period and the interwar period separately.
Since there is only one observation in which alliances and economic cooperation are linked in the same treaty in the pre-WWI period of our sample (and this observation is lost in estimation because of missing trade data), we cannot include a variable representing linked alliances in the analysis of the 1885-1913 time period. In the analysis of the 1885-1938 and 1920-1938 time periods, we expect the coefficient for the variable representing alliances linked to economic agreements to be positive. We also expect alliances that include economic cooperation to have an effect on trade that is greater than the effect from alliances that do not include provisions for economic cooperation.
To test our hypotheses about the influence of alliances on trade, we first specify a 'gravity' equation of bilateral trade and control for other political factors that may also influence trade levels. Gravity formulations are both tractable and consistently successful in providing a base empirical model of dyadic trade, and one can derive the core properties of this model from many standard trade theories (Deardorff, 1998 ). The gravity model predicts aggregate trade levels between countries by their national incomes, capital-labor ratios, and the cost of transporting goods between them (e.g., Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1985) . Theoretical microfoundations of a gravity equation predict an inverse relationship between transportation costs and trade, and a positive relationship between national income and trade. The capital-labor ratio of a country should have a positive relationship to trade when capital intensive goods prevail and most traded goods are luxury items, but negative relationship to trade when labor intensive goods prevail and most traded goods are necessities (Bergstrand, 1989 (Bliss & Russett, 1998; Mansfield, Milner, & Rosendorff, 2000; Dixon & Moon, 1993; Morrow, Siverson, & Tabares, 1999) . Following their research, we include a dichotomous variable for joint democracy (Joint Democracy ijt ) in our model. A state is considered democratic if it scores six or higher on the institutionalized democracy score in the Polity III data (Jaggers & Gurr, 1995) . Morrow, Siverson & Tabares (1998) argue that it is also important to control for the influence of common foreign policy interests in analyzing the trade-alliance relationship, since states with common foreign policies are less likely to experience militarized conflict in the future, and the potential for military conflict should depress trade levels. We include a measure of the degree to which the states have similar foreign policy interests in our model--the global 9 . Because the range of the Similarity variable includes negative values (-1 to 1) and the natural log of a negative value is undefined, we rescale this variable by adding two so that its range is one to three.
10 . The Joint Democracy, Similarity, and MID variables were all computed using the EUgene program (Bennett & Stam, 2000) .
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weighted Similarity (S) score for the dyad (Signorino & Ritter, 1999) . 9 We also control for differences in the international system that may affect international trade flows across different time periods. Specifically, British hegemony before WWI is likely to have contributed to greater trade in the international system (e.g., Krasner, 1976; Kindleberger, 1981) . Therefore, we include a dichotomous variable coded one for the years 1885-1913. We expect the signs on the coefficients for Joint Democracy, Similarity, and Hegemony to be positive.
We anticipate that direct military conflict will decrease trade between states. To control for this, we include a dichotomous variable representing the occurrence of a COW Militarized
Interstate Dispute (MID ijt-1 ) between the states (Jones, Bremer, & Singer, 1996) . Since other studies report that international trade has a significant deterrent effect on militarized conflict (e.g., Russett & Oneal, 2001 ), we lag the militarized interstate dispute variable one year to minimize simultaneity bias in the analysis. (Beck & Katz, 1995 , 1996 . The appendix presents a more detailed discussion of the issues surrounding estimation of time-series, cross-section data. Table I in here   Table I confidence interval is not the same as proving there is no relationship and we do not claim that this finding in itself falsifies any theory.
To test our second hypothesis, we conduct chi-square tests of the null hypothesis that the two coefficients (Linked Alliance and Non-Linked Alliance) are equal for Models 1.1 and 1.2.
For the 1885-1938 time period, we are unable to reject this null hypothesis for a conventional level of statistical significance (p = .12), but we are able to reject the null in the [1920] [1921] [1922] [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] sample (p = .03). In other words, the test shows that the coefficient for linked alliances is greater than the coefficient for non-linked alliances in the inter-war period and this result is statistically significant at a .05 level (4.5, df=1). Thus, we have partial support for our second hypothesis.
Substantively, the linked alliance coefficient indicates that trade is 24% and 29% higher between allies that have explicitly negotiated economic cooperation than trade between nonallies in the 1885-1938 and 1920-1938 time periods, respectively.dummy variable from zero to one (Halvorsen & Palmquist, 1980; Kennedy, 1981; Giles, 1982) .
dyads together without distinguishing those who have promised economic cooperation in their agreements from those who have not, our alliance variable is positive, but insignificant. The formation of alliances that are linked to negotiations for economic cooperation seems to coincide with higher levels of trade among the states. Alliances negotiated without any evidence of economic issue linkage, however, show no impact on dyadic trade levels.
Our control variables also behave mostly as expected. Four of six coefficients for the GDP variables and all three coefficients for the distance variable are in the expected direction and statistically significant. Population has a statistically significant positive effect on trade in five out of six instances, which is consistent with an era characterized by labor intensive production processes and trade in necessity goods. The coefficient for the Border variable is positive in all three models, but only reaches statistical significance in Model 1.2.
The results also show that democratic states are more likely to have higher levels of trade, a finding that is consistent with others' research (Bliss & Russett, 1998; Dixon & Moon, 1993; Morrow, Siverson & Tabares, 1999) . We do not find a statistically significant relationship between the similarity of two countries' foreign policies, but the presence of a hegemonic power in the international system from 1885-1913 appears to contribute to a higher level of trade in this time period, as the positive, significant coefficient on the Hegemony variable demonstrates. The impact of military confrontation on trade is mixed. In our analysis of the inter-war period, the occurrence of a Militarized Interstate Dispute in the previous year deters trade in a dyad; the coefficient on MID is negative and significant. In the full 1885-1938 time frame and the period prior to WWI, however, militarized interstate disputes have no statistically significant impact on trade.
Our argument leads to the expectation that linking economic cooperation and security within alliance agreements is associated with increased trade in a dyad. Among European dyads between 1885 and 1938 we find this to be the case; alliances that propose formation of an economic agreement, include specific provisions for economic aid or concessions, or refer to a companion economic agreement between the states are positively related to trade within a dyad.
Alliances without these links to economic issues are insignificantly related to trade between the states. While our spatial temporal domain is limited, these results encourage further investigation of the bargaining links between trade agreements and alliances.
Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
Our goal in this study was to determine whether an empirical relationship between alliances and increased trade levels might be accounted for by linked bargaining over trade concessions and security commitments. Historical anecdotes and treaty texts suggest to us that issue linkage between economics and security occurs, and our evaluation of the impact of these commitments on trade levels in Europe is commensurate with our argument. Allies whose agreements include economic promises trade more than both non-allied states and allies who have not specified economic links as part of their alliance. Allies who have not addressed economic issues explicitly in their alliance treaties trade no more nor less than non-allied states. This test can be viewed as preliminary support for the claim that increased trade among allies may be a result of the joint negotiation of economic and security issues.
This initial study does not include analysis of the Cold War or post Cold War eras. We look forward to evaluating whether these conclusions are applicable to the post-1945 era once further data become available. In our study of the post-1945 years, we will also have access to more information about preferential trade agreements and trade treaties that are not linked to alliances, which will allow us to compare our argument more directly to the argument made by Mansfield and Bronson (1997) . The extent to which our argument is complementary to Gowa and Mansfield's (2004) argument about the type of goods traded will also become more clear when we study the post WWII era. In the meantime, however, we find the present analysis sufficiently convincing that our argument is worthy of further consideration and exploration.
While expanding the spatial-temporal domain is one goal, at least as importantly we must design better means of determining the conditions under which economic agreements and military agreements are explicitly linked. One way to do this would be to trace the negotiation processes of alliance formation very carefully. An alternative means, however, would be to develop a theory of the conditions under which we should expect linkage to be proposed and to be successful. We prefer the latter route. With a well designed model that predicts the conditions under which we should expect issue linkage, we will be in a much better position to evaluate the empirical relevance first of our claim that linkage is occurring, and then that this linkage may account for the correlation between alliance formation and increased trade.
For the time being, however, this initial test provides reason to pursue this line of inquiry.
The next step will be to establish the conditions under which issue linkage between trade and alliances facilitates cooperation in both. Are governments sometimes more willing to sign trade agreements when they are linked with military cooperation, reducing fears of negative security will not only help answer further questions about the relationship between alliances and trade, but also will provide an improved understanding of when and how proposals for alliance formation and for economic agreements are likely to be successful. This will advance our understanding not only of the impact of cooperation in one issue area on cooperation in other issue areas, but also our understanding of the prospects for the design of successful cooperative agreements.
Appendix: Data and Methodology
This appendix explains our research design, data, and methodology in greater detail. First, we explain why we choose a time-series-cross section design and then describe the limits on the temporal domain of the sample. Next, we provide additional secondary information on the data used to construct the dependent and independent variables where relevant. And finally, we discuss the issues concerning the method of statistical analysis employed to test our hypotheses about the relationship between alliances and bilateral trade on TSCS data.
Research Design and Sample
We utilize a TSCS design because it allows us to capture both changes over time within individual dyads and differences across dyads. Our hypotheses are stated in primarily crosssectional terms, though, and there is little variance in many of our independent variables over the time frame of the analyses. Thus, we are primarily analyzing differences among dyads featuring different characteristics, but we include multiple years of observation to control for differences across time. Also, a TSCS design is consistent with the approach used by others evaluating the relationship between alliances and trade because it allows the best comparison of the effects of different types of alliances.
The temporal domain of our statistical analysis is driven by data availability.
Because ATOP data are not yet available for years beyond 1944, we do not have detailed information about the provisions of alliance treaties available to us for the Post-WWII era.
Trade data for years prior to 1885 and during WWI (1914 WWI ( -1918 and WWII (1939 WWII ( -1944 (Bennett & Stam, 2000) . Particularly prior to WWI, Europe was the center of most international political activity. Information about trade is sparse for non-European states during this era, and only 11% of the alliances included in the ATOP dataset through 1944 are alliances among non-European states (Leeds et al., 2002) .
Variables and Data Sources
The two independent variables we use to test our hypotheses measure linked and non-linked military alliances. We describe the construction of these variables in the text above. Here we provide a description of their frequency for the time period and in the statistical sample after accounting for missing data. In the full sample, 9723 observations (dyad-years) are non-allied, 856 are non-linked alliance observations, and 128 are linked alliance observations. We lose 23 non-linked alliance observations and 3 linked alliance observations in the estimated model due to missing data. The inter-war period contains 6,089 non-allied observations, 524 non-linked alliance observations, and 127 linked alliance observations. Twelve non-linked alliance observations and two linked alliance observations are lost in the estimated sample due to missing values. The pre-WWI sample includes 3,634 non-allied observations, 332 non-linked alliance observations, and one observation of a linked alliance. We lose one non-linked alliance observation and one linked alliance observation in the estimation due to missing data.
We construct the dependent variable for bilateral trade from two sources. Our primary source for this variable is Russett and Oneal (2001) . However, Russett and Oneal (2001) record zero values for trade when neither country in a dyad reports bilateral trade and they are unable to find secondary information indicating that the countries traded with one another in a given year.
We drop these artificial observations from the analysis in Table I . We also include an additional 774 observations of trade from Barbieri's (1998) trade data. The measures from these two sources are correlated at .96 in our sample, and the results of our analysis do not change when using only data from Russett and Oneal (2001) . There are 10,707 dyad-years in the time period (excluding years 1914-1919) . After combining trade data from the two sources we have 9,510 observations of dyadic trade. We converted the trade and GDP data (described below) from millions of current into constant (1982-84 base year) U.S. dollars using consumer price index (CPI) data featured in Sahr (2004) and available at Sahr (2005) .
In addition, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of each country is from Russett and
Oneal (2001), although we predicted missing GDP values from the energy production of each country. These energy production variables and the population variables were collected from the COW capabilities data (Singer, Bremer, & Stuckey, 1972) . These data are available at <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>. Distance is the 'great circle' distance between the capitals of the states and Border is a dichotomous variable coded one when the states share a land border, zero otherwise. The energy production, population, distance, and border variables were acquired using the EUgene program (Bennett & Stam, 2000) and can be accessed at http://eugenesoftware.org/.
One of the independent variables we include to account for additional political factors that determine bilateral trade is a measure of common foreign policy interests, which we operationalize using the Similarity (S) variable developed by Signorino & Ritter (1999) . We also estimate the models with an alternative measure of common interests calculated with the EUgene program, Kendall's tau b of alliance portfolios (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981) , and find very similar results. However, a significant degree of multicollinearity exists between the tau b measure and the alliance variables (the correlations were .7 or higher in each model). The
Similarity variable is not correlated with the alliance variables above .2, and thus we are more confident in the inferences we may draw from the models that include the Similarity variable and report those results in Table I .
Estimation Technique
While we use Prais-Winsten regression, an alternative method for dealing with serial correlation entails including a lagged dependent variable in the model as an additional independent variable, and then estimating the model with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). However, when the independent variables and/or the disturbance term are likely to exhibit significant temporal trending themselves (i.e., values of rho close to one), including a lagged dependent variable and estimating coefficients by OLS induces bias in the coefficients (Achen, 2000; Keele & Kelly 2004) . Because the GDP and population variables are highly correlated over time, we estimate Prais-Winsten regression. Further, Green, Kim & Yoon (2001) argue for using a fixed effects model to account for dyadic and year specific relationships in pooled research designs.
However, Beck & Katz (2001) note the tendency of this approach to overwhelm the substantive effects of dichotomous variables with little temporal variation. Our key independent variables are dichotomous with little temporal variation; thus, we choose to estimate panel-corrected standard errors rather than a fixed effects model.
Finally, all models were estimated using the STATA SE 8.0 statistical program with the xtpcse command and the corr(ar1) and pairwise options. Due to the short temporal range in each analysis and/or the interruption of WWI, the calculation of rho is restarted in the next observation where data is observed. Therefore, our panels fall short of the minimum 30 observations recommended to estimate stable rho coefficients for each individual panel (Beck & Katz, 1996) . As a result, we estimate a single rho coefficient for all panels, bound between -1 and 1, to perform the Prais-Winsten transformation on the model. 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 Year Millions of (1930) U.S. Dollars
